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Abstract 
Numerous immense social and environmental challenges remain unsolved and threaten the 
well-being and welfare of planet and humanity. In the wake of austerity, contractionary fiscal 
policies are the norm and public sector spending is scarce. In consequence, impact-driven 
organizations are chronically underfunded to adequately solve societal challenges. To resolve 
this issue Social Impact Bonds (SIBs) are an innovative financial mechanism to finance the 
delivery of social services. This work builds the evidence base for impact investing through 
SIBs. Therefore, this thesis investigates the SIB model’s feasibility for financing the delivery 
of innovative social services for refugee employment in Germany.  
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Today’s global migration crisis is fuelled by war and prosecution around the globe. Worldwide 
more than 65.6mn people are forcibly displaced (UNHCR, 2017). This includes 22.5mn 
refugees out of which 17% are hosted in the European Union (EU). More than half are children. 
Germany is the prime destination for asylum seekers and asylum claims and grants skyrocketed 
in 2015 and 2016 culminating in an intake of roughly 1.2mn refugees in Germany (OECD, 
2017). The result is a monumental integration challenge. These problems are numerous and 
manifold: accommodation, education, employment and determination of legal status. Although, 
Germany’s current economic and labour market outlook favours the integration of refugees, 
funding for integration remains scarce. This is in no small part due to the high costs associated 
with integration estimated to be as high as 50bn EUR for the years 2016 and 2017 according to 
the DIW, the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW, 2016). Moreover, the Kiel 
Institute for the World Economy (IfW) states the yearly costs for integration at 55bn EUR 
annually until 2022 (IfW, 2015). Against the backdrop of this juxtaposition SIBs are an 
innovative means for financing the integration challenge.  
SIBs are central to today’s impact investing debate. Overall, the strategy for global development 
is based on three pillars. The UN 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the COP 21 
Paris Climate Agreement and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda. Particularly the latter provides 
guidance on finance and investing to advance progress. The central tenets are to “strengthen 
public policies, regulatory frameworks and finance at all levels” and to “unlock the 
transformative potential of people and the private sector” (Addis Agenda, 2017, p.3). SIBs fit 
all the above points and thus function as enablers to unlock the private sector’s potential in 
delivering social goods. Moreover, SIBs are not only ideal for financing but to act as means of 
social innovation as well. Therefore, the SIB model is ideal to finance the delivery of social 
services and to inform policy-making and regulatory reform. Overall, the need for a sustainable 
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financial system is more relevant than ever. Therefore, the social investment market and impact 
investing through SIBs are the necessary enablers to catalyze the force of finance for good. 
Ultimately, this SIB covers five SDGs:  
Figure 1: – Sustainable Development Goals 
           
                   (UNDP, 2017) 
The proposed research entertains a proactive approach and is a practical contribution to the SIB 
debate. Overall, the aim of this thesis is to explore the applicability and feasibility of the SIB 
model for financing social interventions. Doing so this feasibility study is focused on refugee 
integration and related social services delivery in Germany, more precisely on how to best 
increase employment rates of migrants. Today, there is an important research gap to fill. Given 
the social investment market’s infancy, actors in the sector are missing practical, empirical 
evidence and best practices to apply SIBs most appropriately (Dear et al, 2016). Therefore, this 
paper aims to fill this gap by gathering substantive empirical data through a comprehensive SIB 
feasibility study. The overarching research question thus formulates: What are the critical 
success factors of this SIB? To answer this question, this thesis investigates the SIB model for 
financing social interventions on the subject of refugee labor market integration in Germany. 
Fundamentally, this thesis is based on the assumption that the power of capital markets can be 
harnessed to a greater extent than the accumulation of wealth.  
2. Methodology 
This Masters in Management Thesis is the final product of a Directed Research Internship 
(DRI) within the Social Impact Bond Research Programme by the former Laboratório de 
Investimento Social, which today is Maze –Decoding Impact. The programme aims at 
conducting feasibility studies for SIBs by NOVA School of Business & Economics Master 
students to develop the European social investment market.  
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This thesis is based on primary and secondary sources. Primary sources include: European and 
German national registries on immigration and social benefits as well as interviews conducted 
by the author with relevant people such as fund managers, social service providers and 
government officials. Secondary sources are: scholarly research, academic journals, books and 
newspaper articles. The main methods of data collection are desk research and semi-structured 
in-person and telephone interviews. Regular workshops on financial modelling and SIBs were 
part of the DRI. Additionally, fortnightly meetings with the academic supervisor and Director 
of Maze António Miguel were held to provide mentorship and guidance throughout the DRI.  
To sum up, this feasibility study first, explains the concept of SIBs; second, provides a state-
of-the-art literature review on SIBs; third, investigates the public service area to improve and 
defines the social problem; fourth, identifies an intervention model and establishes outcome 
metrics; fifth, develops the SIB business case and lastly provides conclusions and 
recommendations on programme design, procurement and contracting. Structure and 
methodology are adapted from Social Finance UK best practices (Barclay & Simons, 2013).   
3. What are Social Impact Bonds 
Pioneered by Social Finance UK in 2010 the concept of SIBs gained traction in 2013 with the 
launch of the Social Impact Investing Task Force 2013 along the lines of the UK G8 presidency. 
The OECD finds that SIBS “combine three core elements in a single tool: entrepreneurship, 
innovation and investment” (OECD, 2016, p.4) 
To start off with, the SIB model is an innovative social finance construct based on a pay-for-
success regime commissioned by public authorities to provide social services. Whilst the term 
bond is misleading the model leverages private capital via a simple investment structure to 
cover up-front costs of welfare services. This improves social outcomes by funding social 
organizations and accrues future cost savings to society. Costs are outsourced to investors hence 
decreasing the risk in public service innovation. Furthermore, SIBs represent an opportunity to 
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do evidence-based social policy to fund social services that are chronically underfunded in the 
current environment of fiscal recalibration, welfare withdrawal and the overall macroeconomic 
picture of crisis and cost-cutting states. Therefore, it is imperative that social investments yield 
the necessary and intended outcomes. Moreover, SIBs are the ideal instrument for early or 
preventive interventions. In consequence, governments can avert costly reactive interventions 
to matured social problems. Scholars at the MaRS Center for Impact Investing argue: “the cost 
savings generated from tackling the root cause of a negative outcome provides the financial 
incentive for governments to capture this value and look for new ways to fund it” (So & 
Jagelewski, 2013, p.6). Figure 2– Social Impact Bond impact and savings 
 
First, the commissioner agrees on a pay-for-success-based model with all relevant parties such 
as investors and service providers. Second, the social service provider agrees to receive funds 
and provide the social service to its beneficiaries Third, an independent evaluator assesses the 
outcomes on beneficiaries to inform performance management and analyses whether outcomes 
targets are achieved. Fourth, in case of successful delivery and achievement of outcomes the 
commissioner reimburses the investor’s upfront payment plus a premium, which is financed by 
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a portion of the commissioner’s cost savings. Generally, the financial return is subject to the 
achieved outcomes. Therefore, the term bond is misleading as the construct is not a bond per 
se as the return on investment depends exclusively on outcomes. Moreover, SIBs are not subject 
to interest rate risk or market risk. However, SIBs are still exposed to default and inflation risk. 
In short, the SIB model functions are illustrated below. Figure 3: SIB model 
 
To sum up the main goals of SIB financing models are: First, SIBs align the interests and 
operations of public, private and social organizations to achieve better social outcomes. Second, 
SIBs enhance funding to innovate and potentially scale the delivery of social services. Third, 
the SIB model creates an environment for entrepreneurship and innovation to thrive with a 
focus on adequate solutions and improved outcomes. Fourth, SIBs have a strong collaborative 
aspect. Pooling resources and tapping synergies improves the delivery of social services. Fifth, 
the SIB model allows for more rigour and scrutiny of impact analysis, which in turn lays the 
basis to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of social services. Sixth, clear and concise 
outcome measurements catalyse investments into the social sector.  
4. Literature Review 
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In recent years Social Impact Bonds (SIBs) have received much attention from scholars and 
practitioners alike. Given the relative infancy of this financial construct, practical evidence and 
in-depth scholarly analysis remains scarce with only few evaluations of on-going SIBs.  On the 
contrary, the global impact bond market is proliferating at high pace. In 2017, 32 new SIBs 
were procured rising to a worldwide total of 108 SIBs with many more up and coming.  
At Brookings Gustafsson-Wright, Gardiner & Pitcha (2015) provide an in-depth analysis of 
“The Potential and Limitations of Impact Bonds”. Additionally, Emilie Goodall from Bridges 
Ventures authored “A Practitioner’s Guide” to SIBs (2014). Moreover, in the white paper 
“Better Outcomes, Better Value”, Bridges Ventures examines the evolution of SIBs in the UK 
(Bridges Ventures, 2016). At Social Finance UK Barclay & Symons offer a “Technical Guide 
to Developing Social Impact Bonds” (2013). Furthermore, Dear et al. (2016) from Social 
Finance UK provide a thorough account of the current state of play of SIBs.  
On the one hand, academic literature widely agrees that the SIB financing model allows for 
improved results by aligning and enabling the three main parties concerned. First, the scheme 
allows commissioners to “focus resources on outcomes”, “invest in intervention and 
preventative services” and to “stimulate innovation” (Goodall, 2014, p.7). Second, service 
providers “have scope to innovate” and the ability to “grow services” (ibid, 2014, p.9). Third, 
investors have the opportunity to “link financial returns to social outcomes” and to “catalyse 
entrepreneurial solutions” (ibid, p.11). What’s more, SIB financing allow for testing of 
interventions. Against the background of scarce state funding and the public sector’s reluctance 
to invest, this is a particularly powerful tool. SIBs provide the opportunity to investigate what 
works and at which costs whilst limiting the financial risk to the public sector. 
Goodall points to a number of case studies such as Career Connect, Utah High Preschool 
Program, Multi-Systemic Therapy, and Teens & Toddlers Innovation, illustrating the numerous 
benefits and added-value of SIB-financed solutions for social problems. Moreover, Gustafsson-
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Wright et al. attempt a general evaluation of SIBs to date and conclude that SIBs provided the 
following positive evidence. Generally, SIBs “focus on outcomes, drive performance 
management, incentivize collaboration, build a culture of monitoring and evaluation, invest in 
prevention and reduce risk for government” (Gustafsson-Wright et al, 2017, p. 13). On the 
other hand, SIBs missed to provide evidence to “crowd in private funding, achieve scale, 
support experimental interventions and sustain impact” (ibid, p.13). 
Academic and practical reflections on SIBs also produced various critiques. Amongst the most 
prominent concerns is the fear of privatization of public service delivery. In short, the argument 
is that private investors make profits on social problems. Mission drift within social 
organizations due to profit motives is another major concern. In addition, critics argue that the 
SIB model’s strong focus on outcomes is not positive at all as it leads to a form of cherry picking 
as only easily solvable problems are addressed (OECD, 2016, p.19). Moreover, the market for 
SIB financing is limited as pay-for-success schemes work best when cashable savings incur to 
the government. Others point out that “the focus on cashable savings needlessly imposes the 
economic logic of the investor onto the government commissioner” (Brown, 2013). In turn, this 
limits a SIB’s purpose to saving the government money, whilst in fact the other important 
purpose is to drive public sector intervention. Along those lines, the save-today-pay-tomorrow 
has its drawbacks as commissioners tend to be sceptical about how and when savings 
materialize in the future. Today’s limited evidence base aggravates this concern. To sum up the 
argument Brown holds that, “focusing on cashable savings risks limiting the scope and viability 
of SIBs as well as misrepresenting their main purpose which is to drive social innovation” 
(ibid, 2013).  
According to Bridges Ventures the SIB model is steadily growing more efficient (2016) and 
“SIB-funded programmes have already had a powerful positive impact” (ibid, p.6). 
Nonetheless, the white paper recognized scope for improvement in three important areas. First, 
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the market needs to grow more efficient. Changing role of intermediaries from all-rounder 
market makers to specialist advisors, “preventing conflicts of interest, speeding up development 
times, reducing costs” (ibid, p.6). Second, the SIB model needs to be applied more broadly. 
Widening its scope would unlock vast opportunities for social outcomes and it “may even 
prompt a paradigm shift in the way we tackle big social challenges” (ibid). Moreover, the 
authors state that “there is a substantial opportunity for outcomes contracts in improving 
existing services, i.e. in helping commissioners achieve better results where they already have 
a targeted spend”. Third, SIBs need to create more value. The authors argue that for SIBs to 
“succeed at scale” the model needs to enhance social and financial outcomes for 
commissioners vis-à-vis alternative financing mechanisms. To that end, “if the SIB fails to 
deliver demonstrably better results than the commissioner’s ‘best available comparable 
option’, the additional cost to the government should always be zero” (ibid, p.6). 
Bridges Ventures points to the fact that the “best outcomes contracts use staggered payments”. 
That is to say that commissioners “pay for milestones reached along the way” provided that 
each milestone is a step towards the achievement of the ultimate outcome, which is shared by 
investor and commissioner. Results include discipline on the provider, greater efficiency, 
reduced working capital needs, keep costs down and feedback, evaluation and adaption 
(Bridges Ventures, 2016).  
In their “Technical Guide to Developing SIBs” Barclay & Simons (2013) portray the SIB 
development process. It’s important to note that SIBs “will not apply in all circumstances” and 
“in many areas, traditional funding (…) remains most appropriate”. Therefore, proper 
investigation whether a SIB model is applicable is paramount. To do so, the two scholars set 
out an eight-step SIB development framework. First, it’s crucial to “assess the service area that 
needs reshaping”. Ideally, this is a “discussion as to whether an outcomes contract (…) is the 
best way to commission services”. Consequently, the output should be an “agreement to 
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explore social investment options as part of the service redesign” (ibid, p.7). Second, SIB 
developers have to “define the social issues”. A “defined target population and engaged 
commissioners” should be the deliverables. To achieve these outputs analysis of population, 
macroeconomic, and social trends as well as costs is essential. Moreover, “stakeholder 
engagement” is vital “to understand strategic objectives” (ibid, p.7). The third point, namely 
the “definition of outcome metrics” deserves special attention so as to “ensure success of 
interventions” (p.7). These should be linked to investor payments to align interests, maximize 
the chance of success generating the right incentives for all parties involved. Fourth, “defining 
the interventions” determines not only which organization receives funding but also shape and 
scope of social service delivery. Fifth, “assessing the value-for-money case” ensures the social 
and economic feasibility of the SIB financing model. The goal is on the one hand to “deliver 
cashable resource savings” and on the other hand to “finance innovation” (p. 20). The main 
question is: “Does the financing model generate savings to the local authority and a return for 
investors in an acceptable time frame?” (ibid). Sixth, “programme design” portrays a 
“detailed operating plan and payment terms” to “form the basis of the SIB contract” (ibid, 
p.21). The operating plan builds on the “initial recommendations made in the value-for-money 
case to a detailed plan” taking into account various steps such as caseload assumptions on 
initial capital expenditure or set-up costs, coordination with existing services and service 
delivery partners as well as performance management. Moreover, illustrating clearly the 
payment mechanism is vital to ensure correct reimbursement of investors. To that end the 
timing of payments and above all appropriate outcome metrics and outcome measurement are 
crucial. The ultimate output of the programme design is the term sheet that “summarises the 
main elements of the SIB contract” (ibid, p.23) to kick off the investment raising. Seventh, 
“procurement” of an SIB vary and types of contracts include Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) 
or direct contracts between commissioner and service providers. Generally, however, the public 
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sector commissioner will launch an official procurement process to initiate procurement in 
order to officially contract a “social-investment backed provider to deliver the SIB outcomes 
contract” (ibid, p.24) (For a more detailed overview please see: Commissioning Social Impact 
Bonds, Social Finance UK, 2011). Eight, “contracting” is the last part of SIB development with 
two main outputs. One, “the development of the SIB outcomes contract” and two, “the 
principles behind the SIB governance structure” (ibid, p. 25). The prior relates key contract 
clauses such as objectives, investment amount, time frame, intervention, etc. whereas the aim 
of the latter is to “ensure that the relative needs of each party” are met. This happens generally 
on two levels. First, on the strategic level this means i.e. “review of contract performance” or 
“implications of wider policy development” (ibid, p. 26). Second, on the operational level 
contracting includes simple “contract management, review of referral processes, multi-agency 
advice on cases”, etc. (ibid). Lastly, the signed contract allows for the start of formal fundraising 
to initiate the intervention. To sum up, academia and practitioners alike agree that SIBs are an 
attractive means of funding the delivery of social services vis-à-vis financially constrained 
public budgets. However, controversial aspects remain, which is why feasibility studies such 
as this are imperative to the success of SIBs and essential to prevent the simple privatization of 
public services. All in all, the design, applicability and feasibility of a SIB construct determine 
its success.  
4. Understanding the Social Problem 
Although asylum applications have decreased in 2017, the chances of successfully and 
sustainably returning most migrants to their countries of origin are very slim. Most are here to 
stay. Therefore, there is a need for comprehensive and cohesive long-term integration. 
Currently, the situation is not adequately addressed. Furthermore, the issue of migrant 
integration is ambiguous and relates to housing, education, job access, healthcare, high public 
spending, cultural differences, and many more. Whilst all of these aspects deserve attention, 
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this SIB investigates the feasibility of an intervention to tackle labour market integration. The 
reason for this lies in the high costs incurred to the government. Unemployment generally 
results in three main cost drivers for the government: first, expenditure on unemployment and 
social benefits; second, administrative costs associated to benefit payout; and third, missed tax 
revenue. The Center for Economics Studies (CES) estimates the annual government costs per 
refugee to be 19.181.00 € (CES, 2015). The DIW, however, states the costs per refugees to be 
an estimated 12.000.00 € per annum (DIW, 2015). Under conservative estimates this amounts 
to 12.000.000.000.00 € annually, with much higher negative externalities and spill-overs as a 
result of unsuccessful integration (Bratsberg et al, 2016). The situation is complicated, 
expensive and is further entangled by two main systemic root causes. First, an under supply of 
language courses and long waiting times for these and no work-related courses. Second, the 
inability of migrants to navigate the multi-facetted and complex German job market. Moreover, 
local authorities are pressured to deliver social services to migrants such as training, housing, 
healthcare and employment and pay-out of benefits. However, these agencies have little 
experience, are overburdened and underfunded. In consequence, human, social and economic 
capital is wasted. This is particularly absurd given that roughly 1mn jobs are vacant in Germany 
today. In sum, the situation demands innovative public policies, fresh financing and social 
service delivery at its best. The question now is, how to provide solutions to solve the language 
skills issue and the job market access problem. However, there is opportunity in adversity. 
Through this SIB, two social ventures with a strong and proven intervention model can be 
financed to provide social services to migrants and prevent the situation from aggravating and 
prevent exacerbated future costs to state and society.  Innovating for better migrant outcomes 
is essential for the functioning of the German society, economic growth and individual well-
being. Therefore, this thesis suggests a long-term preventative approach targeting the needs of 
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migrants and promoting their integration addressing the two main problems namely, language 
skills and job market entry. 
To guarantee the best possible results of this SIB, it is crucial to adequately frame and scope 
the target audience. To that end, this SIB takes into account the following considerations. First, 
the geographical scope is the city state of Berlin, for two reasons: one, it is the German state 
with the highest unemployment rate (migrants and natives); two, it is the state with the highest 
per-capita migrant influx. Second, only migrants from the age of 18 to 29 are considered, as 
those are most likely to render the highest cost savings to the state in the long-term. Third, all 
participants have to have the legal right-to-stay and must be receiving unemployment and social 
benefits according to German law.  
Currently, outcomes for refugees looking for employment in Germany show a mixed picture. 
Today, around 9% of registered job seekers are refugees (OECD, 2017).  The Bundesamt für 
Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF), that is the state office for migration and refugees, provides 
language and integration courses, with lukewarm results. The BAMF budget for integration 
courses in 2017 was 1.020.000.000.00 €. Moreover, methods of data collection are inadequate 
and their services are not likely to improve without drastic innovation (Schroeder, 2017). 
BAMF courses typically conclude with the DTZ, a final test awarding A2 or B1 certifications. 
40.08% pass with B1, whilst another 33.7% receive A2. These numbers are not tangible at all 
as they include an unspecified number of retakes. Even worse, many do not even sign up for 
these tests, which is also an unknown number. In sum, outcomes and outcomes measurement 
at the BAMF are questionable at best. Next, the Bundesagentur für Arbeit (BA), that is the state 
agency for employment, is responsible for providing labour market entry assistance and 
services. Whilst no clear data is available on how successful the BA is in putting refugees into 
work, it is known that in March 2018, the BA had a y-o-y success rate of 13.04% to employ the 
age group 15 to 25. This includes refugees and natives alike. What’s known from other EU 
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countries, the success rate of refugee labour market integration in the first year ranges from 
15%-25% (OECD, 2017). The Belgian employment agency Actiris has a success rate of roughly 
25% (Simonart, 2018). To sum up, the efficiency of German labour market integration could 
be better comparing Belgium and Germany. To conclude, the the Federal Audit Office stated 
in 2017 that one should assume that “a large chunk of the committed funds missed the mark” 
(Zeit, 2017), which demonstrates the need for innovation and enhanced efficiency of social 
services. A 2016 BAMF survey found that professional integration is the most desired wish 
amongst refugees (Worbs und Bund, 2016). Thus, the next section illustrates this SIB’s 
intervention model to facilitate labor market entry of refugees. 
5. Identifying a Strong Intervention Model 
To start off with, the status quo of social services aimed at professional integration needs to be 
improved. Whilst BAMF and BA alongside jobcenters are working hard to achieve better 
outcomes, two main problems with the status quo are identified. First, the BAMF is not 
measuring outcomes adequately. It is not known how effective language and integration courses 
are. Second, the BA and jobcenters are not efficient enough, resulting in high government costs. 
To tackle both aspects, this intervention model combines the two main promises of a SIB. On 
the one hand, this intervention offers innovation for better outcomes measurement, on the other 
hand this intervention offers cashable cost savings by delivering better outcomes vis-a-vis state 
services. To tackle the two-sided issue of insufficient language skills and inadequate knowledge 
to navigate the job market, a two-pronged approach is suggested. First, the Portuguese social 
business SPEAK perfectly addresses the language skills issue. Second, the Belgian social 
venture DUO for a JOB has established a track record of successfully providing mentorship to 
migrants facilitating job market access. This section explains first the two interventions and 
how better outcomes are achieved. Second, the services of SPEAK and DUO are combined for 
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the intervention model of the SIB. This graph presents an overview of potential players 
involved: Figure 4: Berlin SIB model 
 
SPEAK is a Portuguese-founded social business headquartered in Lisbon operating in 10 
European cities with a customer base of 13.900 people from 147 countries. SPEAK is a 
“linguistic and cultural program”, which aims to “promote the inclusion and sense of belonging 
of migrants, refugees and expats, so that they live in harmony with their communities” (SPEAK, 
2017, p.2). SPEAK language courses span three months, covering 18 90-minutes classes and 
courses are given by migrants and locals for migrants and local within each community with a 
minimum of four and a maximum of 15 students (ibid, 2017). First, language courses are aimed 
to “break the language barrier with an informal and innovative methodology”. Second, the 
creation of “networks between migrants/refugees and locals” to promote integration. In detail, 
SPEAK states that participants have a 15% “improvement in the sense of belonging to the local 
community”, a 30% “decrease in linguistic barriers” and a 40% increased “sense of valorization 
of culture of each participant” (ibid, p.3).  Additionally, SPEAK just expanded to Berlin in 
2017. SPEAK differentiates itself through being a very low-cost alternative as the program 
costs only 25,00 € per participant, and through an online2offline business model with which 
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administrative costs are minimized. “Removing the target population’s purchasing power from 
the equation” creates a clear connection between social impact and sustainability. Ultimately, 
SPEAK’s financial returns depend on the ability “to satisfy the largest possible number of 
participants” (ibid, p.7). The major drawback of SPEAK’s intervention is that its outcomes are 
hard to measure. Aforementioned outcomes are measured through qualitative participant 
questionnaires. SPEAK courses do not conclude with an officially approved language test and 
certificate based on CEFR, the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages. 
Interestingly, however, the company is looking for funding to scale their German operations. 
Ultimately, this is the ideal case for SIB-financing as the company provides innovative 
solutions to a public service area that needs reshaping.  
Next to SPEAK, DUO for a JOB is a social business that provides intergenerational coaching 
to young migrants helping them to enter the local job market. This mentoring programme 
“facilitates the future employment of young people” whilst providing elderly citizens with the 
opportunity to engage. DUO started with SIB financing in 2014 in Brussels, Belgium, a region 
with high youth unemployment, particularly amongst migrants and one of Europe’s lowest 
employment rates of elders aged 55-64. DUO combines these two problems and creates an 
opportunity in which knowledge is retained and passed on towards people lacking the skills and 
experience to find employment. DUO is highly successful and has programs in all major 
Belgian urban areas and is venturing into Italy and France. In 2016, the number of duos grew 
by 60% y-o-y. Overall, DUO’s impact culminates in a 44% employment rate after six months 
and a 53% employment rate after 12 months accompanied by a 22% and 20% access rate to 
trainings and placements, respectively. DUO’s intervention is twice as successful as the current 
service delivery of Actiris, the Brussels region employment agency (Simonart, 2018). Roughly 
a quarter is in permanent jobs and a third is in temporary contracts. On the other hand, 27% 
remain unemployed. However, another 18% return to education and some turn entrepreneurs 
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and start their own business. Currently, the organization is financed completely through 
endowments and grants of which 80% are from the private sector and 20% from Actiris, the 
commissioner of the DUO SIB. This share is constantly increasing according to Frédéric 
Simonart, CEO and founder of DUO. The intervention itself is simple. Over a six-month 
program pairs of mentors and mentees are formed, which have at least four weekly contact 
hours. These are free for mentors and mentee to share, discuss and work individually. On top, 
the programme includes CV reviews and workshops, practice interviews, career coaching, 
speech therapy and a housing guide. In Belgium mentees are provided with introductory courses 
to business administration and entrepreneurship in partnership with the social organization 
Youthstart.  However, the true value lies in personal activities and support such as translation, 
proof-reading, accompanying mentees, legal, administrative and accounting help or simply a 
trustful person. Furthermore, at the beginning of each cohort, the mentors receive in-depth 
training and are constantly supported throughout the program by DUO staff. Combining 
SPEAK and DUO to improve labour market access of refugees in Germany leads to the 
following intervention model.  
The program methodology merges the mentorship programme of DUO and SPEAK’s language 
courses. The SIB-financed target group continuously takes part in the 6-month DUO mentor 
program until employment is found. On the side, the target group joins SPEAK language 
courses. Both interventions work towards the same aim, namely fast-track refugees’ entry to 
the labour market. The program lasts four years, with each duo lasting six months accompanied 
with continuous SPEAK courses over the span of four years. The program is designed to cover 
five cohorts, each starting semi-annually. In sum, each cohort is in the program for two years. 
In short, the base case scenario of the intervention employs 943 people out of 1000 after four 
years, compared to 712 employed through current public services. 231 more people in 
employment or outcomes that 23,1% better vis-à-vis current public services.  
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To assess the success of this intervention the following measurement framework is most 
suitable. To start off with, a reference group is set up and surveyed over the intervention’s time 
frame. This reference group follows status quo public services provided by BAMF, BA and 
jobcenters. Next to that, the target group following the intervention’s various cohorts is 
examined at the end of each duo, that is each six months. Similarly, stocktaking of the 
government’s service provision is conducted via semi-annual assessment of the reference 
group. As a result, this clear and concise framework allows for the precise measurement of the 
intervention’s success. The data gathered throughout the SIB can be easily compared to large 
data pools of BAMF and BA. Moreover, objective measures include BA statistics showing the 
number of refugees receiving unemployment and social benefits. The following graph 
demonstrates the client journey of the target group. Figure 5: SIB intervention model 
 
To conclude this intervention rests on qualitative and quantitative business-oriented 
assumptions. These are further explained in the next section to illustrate the economics of the 
intervention and how the financials play out over the four-year program.  
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6. Developing a SIB Business Case 
This business case analysis rests on a dynamic financial model built with Excel. This model is 
the key output of this work and lays the ideal basis for further applied, real-life investigation of 
the problem set in order to realize this SIB. Above all, the excel simulates the financial and 
social returns of this SIB financing model. Overall, the financial model proves the compelling 
business case of this SIB. Ultimately, the financial model connects the funding flows necessary 
for DUO and SPEAK to deliver their services and achieve social impact. Additionally, the 
model reflects on the intervention costs, the required up-front investment, the cost savings 
accrued to the government, and the investor returns. Figure 1 in the What are Social Impact 
Bonds? Section illustrates the value-for-money calculation rationale. Please see the annex for 
a precise breakdown of inputs and outputs of the model.  
The financial model includes four sheets: an input sheet for general data, program inputs 
specifying success rates of intervention cohorts and status quo services, an outcomes input sheet 
showing the revenues and costs of intervention vis-à-vis status quo, and a sheet showing the 
financial statements from an investor perspective. The necessary assumptions and data to model 
the intervention costs were gathered through interviews with SPEAK COO Pedro Tunes and 
DUO CEO Frédéric Simonart. Other caseload assumptions stem from interviews with BA and 
BAMF employees as well as available scholarly literature. They core part of the model is the 
financial statements sheet. Combining inputs such as intervention costs, status quo costs, 
intervention outcomes and project length, cohort size, state tariff, taxes, cash flow delay, the 
financial statements allow for insights regarding the total delivery costs, investor requirement, 
project surplus and investor IRR. The following scenario analysis portrays three different cases 
in an optimistic scenario, a base case and a pessimistic scenario. This provides the reader with 
an overview of caseload assumptions, the critical variables and their sensitivity.  
Table 1: Scenario analysis 
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  Pessimistic Realistic Optimistic 
Intervention Model 
Inputs     
Intervention Success Rate 50% 60% 70% 
State tariff 80% 80% 80% 
Time to Outcome 6 Months 6 Months 6 Months 
Refugee Costs  12.000,00 €   12.000,00 €   12.000,00 €  
Cohort Size 1200 1200 1200 
Project Overview     
Refugees Employed 1065 1131 1171 
Maximum Contract Value  3.766.048,77 €   5.370.279,15 €   6.656.397,57 €  
Project Costs  2.453.500,00 €   2.258.000,00 €   2.040.700,00 €  
Investor Requirement -751.813,51 €  -669.901,92 €  -616.630,14 €  
Financial Outputs     
IRR 33% 142% 260% 
Investment Multiple 1,7x 4,7x 7,4x 
Potential lowest state 
tariff for 1% IRR 
68% 44% 33% 
Outcomes per target  17.846,75 €   19.379,07 €   20.998,27 €  
        
 
From this scenario analysis one can conclude that the key variable is the intervention’s success 
rate. On top, the realistic and optimistic scenarios allow for an increase in retained earnings for 
the state as IRR and investment multiples are very positive. It’s important to note, that although 
cohort size remains constant, investor requirement goes down due to an increase in success rate. 
In other words, cash flows occur earlier so that less upfront funding is needed for a shorter 
period of time. Similarly, investors are paid out earlier. Moreover, 22.443 people in Berlin were 
eligible to start the integration course in 2017 with subsidies from the government (BA, 2017). 
Being eligible for a subsidized integration course means one is receiving unemployment and 
social benefits. In consequence, one can deduce the market size for this intervention. In turn, 
demand for this intervention is high and the more people participate, the higher the investor 
IRR and the social outcome. In the base scenario the up-front investment amount required from 
investors to start the project amounts 669.901,92 €. Investors are paid back a premium on their 
investment representing an IRR of 142%. Moreover, investors start receiving payments 11 
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months after their up-front investments and break-even 23 months after the investment. 
Furthermore, the project has a total surplus of 3.144.479,15 €. If the government pays a 100% 
tariff on the outcomes, no cashable savings are retained by the state, but still a social problem 
is solved. With an 80% pay-out as simulated in the scenarios, 2.515.583,32 € are paid out to 
investors whereas 628.895,83 are cashable savings for the state. This means that the 
government departments that will financially benefit if the social outcomes are achieved are 
first, the state agency for employment under the supervision of the state ministry of interior, 
and second, the state office for migration and refugees under the supervision of the state 
ministry of employment and social affairs. Due to complex country-specific relationships 
between the German federal government and states, who share the financial burden for above 
mentioned social services, further research needs to be conducted to identify which state entity 
is the most feasible commissioner. To conclude, the financial modelling portrays feasible costs 
and benefits of the intervention. The following section sums up the main findings and concludes 
with final recommendations. 
7. Conclusions and Recommendations 
Today, the conditions for integrating refugees into the German labour market are very positive 
(OECD, 2017). However, due to rigid public sector structures an answer to the integration 
question is only coming about slowly. Against this background, SIBs are the ideal tool for 
public sector innovation. This SIB combines the dual purpose of SIBs as it first, aims to 
innovate the BAMF’s language and integration courses through SPEAK and second, accrues 
cost savings to the government through more efficient services. Hence, this SIB is the perfect 
case study to further build the evidence base of social investment in Germany.  
The track record of both social businesses demonstrate the potential of SPEAK and DUO, but 
further empirical data is needed to validate the underlying assumptions of this SIB and to test 
the overall working hypothesis of the intervention model. To that end, a small-scale pilot is 
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recommended to inform further financial modelling and to improve the intervention model of 
this SIB. As the UNHCR finds, “one particularly cost-efficient way of providing support is 
through mentorship programmes” (OECD, UNHCR, 2018, p.18). In their most recent joint 
publication OECD and UNHCR underline the importance and (cost-)effectiveness of 
mentorship programmes similar to DUO’s (ibid), which further underpins the adequacy of this 
intervention. Due to the limits of this paper further research, in the form of aforementioned pilot 
needs to be conducted before this SIB can be realized. According to the OECD, continuous 
integration efforts should “improve frameworks for integration management” through “data 
gathering, transparency of information” and adequate “measuring and evaluation”. (OECD, 
2017). Moreover, “enhanced collaboration amongst actors” is likely to facilitate better 
outcomes (ibid, 2017). Other than that, the OECD points to the importance to “leverage civil 
society” to bridge cultural divides and foster integration. The intervention proposed by this SIB 
touches on these pillars. First, this SIB provides new approaches to data collection, 
measurement and evaluation. To improve a SIB model’s success, transparent, tangible 
information of outcomes is essential to evaluate impact. Therefore, a clear measurement 
framework with concise outcome metrics is at the heart of this SIB and can improve the 
BAMF’s outcomes measurements. Second, combining actors from the social, public and private 
sector, this SIB fosters collaboration amongst stakeholders to align interests and to streamline 
efforts to achieve greater results. Third, this SIB leverages civic engagement through DUO’s 
mentorship program. It’s recommended that further refugee integration efforts include 
employers as well. Generally, SIBs have a two-fold purpose: on the one hand, that is to save 
government money and on the other hand to drive innovation in the social sector. This SIB’s 
two service delivery organizations approach this two-fold purpose. First, the DUO intervention 
delivers a social service more efficient and effective than current state-run provision of services. 
Second, the SPEAK intervention provides an innovative approach to language teaching. 
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Innovation is much needed in the competency area of the BAMF as their service provision is 
not scientifically surveyed. Hence, no clear data is available on the success of these services. 
What’s known, however, is that outcomes are not as good as they potentially could be with 
SPEAK. Therefore, implementing SPEAK with transparent and accountable data collection 
methods and tangible statistics will innovate the service area of language course provision. 
Lastly, it is crucial to design this intervention in a way that allows “systematic monitoring of 
performance and collection of data” (Barclay & Simons, 2013). Therefore, a rigorous case-
management system and clear governance structures of the financial construct and service 
providers is recommended. It’s important to note that this paper acknowledges limitations due 
to its limited length and scope. First, the financial model is based on qualitative and quantitative 
assumptions. Although these are very conservative, their explanatory power is limited. The 
model does not account for a precise breakdown of cost factors, due to the limited amount of 
valid data attainable. Second, the interaction with potential commissioners was limited due to 
unclear competencies within the BAMF and BA. Additionally, potential investors were not 
approached during this feasibility study, however, SPEAK and DUO are both in need of 
funding and are generally open for SIB funding in Berlin. Hence, the next steps en route to 
implementation should be to discuss the project with all stakeholders in more detail, particularly 
with commissioners and potential investors to bring aforementioned pilot underway. To 
conclude, the Berlin SIB feasibility study demonstrates that SIB financing is appropriate and 
attainable for financing innovative solutions for the labour market entry of refugees in 
Germany.  Lastly, the World Investment Report 2014 finds, the investment gap for achieving 
the SDGs amounts to 2.5tn USD. Therefore, SIBs are a potential instrument to channel 
investment towards achieving the SDGs. This feasibility study thus lays the basis for 
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